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According to the Post Keynesian Economics, un-
certainty is the most essential characteristic of the real 
world in which we live (Carvalho, 1992; Davidson, 
1972; 1991; 1996; Rousseas, 1998, p. 17). Emphasis on 
uncertainty is the characteristic that differ Post Keynes-
ianism from all other schools of economic thought. We 
can remind that uncertainty is the situation when agents 
do not know both quantity of possible future events and 
probabilities of these events. Therefore, the probability 
theory is irrelevant for an analysis of situations in which 
uncertainty takes place (Davidson, 1991). As Keynes 
(1937, pp. 213 – 214) wrote: “By “uncertain” 
knowledge, let me explain, I do not mean merely to dis-
tinguish what is known for certain from what is only 
probable. The game of roulette is not subject, in this 
sense, to uncertainty; nor is the prospect of a Victory 
bond being drawn. Or, again, the expectation of life is 
only slightly uncertain. Even the weather is the only 
moderately uncertain. The sense in which I am using the 
term is that in which the prospect of a European war is 
uncertain, or the price of copper and the rate of interest 
twenty years hence, of the obsolescence of a new inven-
tion, or the position of private wealth-owners in the so-
cial system in 1970. About these matters there is no sci-
entific basis on which to form any calculable probability 
whatever. We simply do not know”.  
In turn, the uncertainty of the future can be classi-
fied as ontological uncertainty and epistemological un-
certainty (Davidson, 1996). The latter implies that fu-
ture is uncertain but knowable. In other words, episte-
mological uncertainty is a kind of uncertainty explored 
by the Austrian school. Each agent almost does not 
know about knowledge, preferences and expectations of 
other agents. Therefore, the government will never be 
able to give those “good” outcomes provided by the 
market system. However, the market system gathers this 
information and generates true decisions. It means that 
information gathered and processed by the market is 
knowable.   
Ontological uncertainty implies that relevant infor-
mation is not only uncertain but also unknowable. The 
point is that a lot of information is not created yet. It 
means that between the present and the future there are 
ontological differences. Ontological uncertainty is the 
characteristic of a transmutable reality or non-ergodic 
environment (Davidson, 1996). In a transmutable reality 
“the future can be permanently changed in nature and 
substance by the actions of individuals, groups… and/or 
governments, often in ways not completely foreseeable 
by the creators of change” (Davidson, 1996, p. 482). 
The essential principle of – inspired by Post 
Keynesianism – comparative analysis of various eco- 
nomic systems is to analyze how institutions of these 
systems try to reduce uncertainty. “How we try to cope 
with uncertainty defines the system under which we 
live. Capitalism has one way of doing it, socialism an-
other” (Rousseas, 1998, p. 17).   
The market capitalism – or, according to the Post 
Keynesian terminology – monetary economy – is the 
economic system which tries to reduce uncertainty by 
means of such institutions as forward contracts, money 
and the state. It is necessary to note that money matters 
in this context as a means of discharging contracts – 
therefore, “… money and contracts intimately and inev-
itably related” (Panagopoulos and Spiliotis, 1998, p. 650 
– 651; see also Davidson, 1977). The state is very im-
portant as the enforcer of contracts (Davidson, 1972; 
Carvalho, 1992). Contracting without state enforcement 
is unreliable, insecure and frail. That is why, according 
to Post Keynesian Economics, monetary economy is the 
economy based on a system of forward contracts (Car-
valho, 1992, p. 102). “Without forward contracts… life 
under capitalism would be violently unstable” (Rous-
seas, 1998, p. 23). 
These and some other uncertainty-reducing institu-
tions provide some order and predictability in the eco-
nomic life under capitalism. In particular, institutions 
“contribute to the stability of the social world, by stabi-
lizing people’s way of acting” (Dequech, 2004, p.372). 
At the same time, contracts and other institutions cannot 
completely eliminate uncertainty regarding, first of all, 
financial flows of private agents. “In a monetary econ-
omy output is determined by effective demand and there 
is no reason why effective demand should be at the level 
of full employment” (Marangos, 2002, p. 575). As a re-
sult, business cycles, crises and unemployment are the 
normal outcome of market capitalist economy’s func-
tioning (Carvalho, 1992; Davidson, 1972; Minsky, 
1986), and, therefore, there is a need for discretionary 
macroeconomic – fiscal and monetary – policy of the 
government. Such stabilization policy can reduce uncer-
tainty regarding financial inflows of firms and other pri-
vate agents. Other means of further uncertainty-reduc-
ing activity under market capitalism can be Central 
Bank activity as a lender of last resort (Minsky, 1986) 
and “monopolistic concentrations of market power 
through vertical and horizontal integration, conglomer-
ate mergers, product differentiation, and still other ways 
of amassing economic power” (Rousseas, 1998, p. 22).  
All these arguments are the fundamentals of the 
Post Keynesian approach to an analysis of the Western 
types of market capitalism. Post Keynesian Economics 
takes into account features of the contemporary ad-
vanced economies of the Western capitalistic countries 
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and can offer relevant “cures” for various economic 
“diseases” of these countries.  
What about other varieties of capitalism and other 
economic system? According to the Post Keynesian ap-
proach, social and economic successes and failures of 
such systems should be concerned, in the first place, 
with uncertainty-reducing institutions and their influ-
ence on key macroeconomic decisions, in particular, in-
vestment and financial ones. I think that it is precisely 
Post Keynesian Economics that explains essential prob-
lems of “backward” models of capitalism. One of such 
examples is the Post-Soviet Russian capitalism. Post 
Keynesian approach was already applied to different as-
pects of the Post-Soviet Russian economy (see Dzara-
sov, 2010; Dzarasov; 2011) or post-socialist economies 
in general (Dow et al., 2008; Lah and Sušjan, 1999; Ma-
rangos, 2002), but this paper tries to analyze succes-
sively the most essential features of the contemporary 
Russian economic system using the basic principles of 
Post Keynesianism. I emphasize Uncertainty, Institu-
tions, Investment, Money and its surrogates as the main 
“building blocks” of the Russian economy’s analysis on 
the base of Post Keynesian Economics.  
 
Institutions of the Post-Soviet Russian Capita- 
lism and Uncertainty 
The starting point of the arguments is as follows: 
institutions of the Post-Soviet Russian capitalism reduce 
uncertainty very ineffectively, and contemporary Rus-
sian capitalist economy is the system characterized by 
higher uncertainty (in comparison with the Western 
capitalist economies). In order to understand reasons for 
it is necessary to analyze how the Post-Soviet Russian 
model of capitalism emerged.  
The most part of the Russian economic history in 
the twentieth century was the history of the planned 
economy. According to the Post Keynesian view, such 
economic system can be treated as the alternative – to 
capitalism – set of uncertainty-reducing institutions (see 
above quote from Rousseas, 1998, p. 17). The central-
ized plans’ directives, fixed prices, guaranteed employ-
ment (and sales), absence of private entrepreneurship 
and stock exchange are elements of institutional envi-
ronment that reduce institutions under the planned so-
cialism. The detailed Post Keynesian analysis of such 
system’ performance waits in the wings. 
In the beginning of the 1990s Russian system be-
came economy in transition. There was an “institutional 
transformation”: the economy moved from the planned 
socialism to some model of capitalism. Such transition 
itself generated serious problems of economic coordina-
tion. The institutional hiatus (Kozul-Wright and Ray- 
ment, 1997, p. 643) emerged: “the old command system 
had collapsed before the new coordinating mechanisms 
of the market economy could be put in its place and gen-
erate effective responses”. Such phenomena as “transi-
tion uncertainty” (Marangos, 2002, p. 575) and transfor-
mational recession (Kornai, 1993) took place. 
The important point is that the transition to the mar-
ket capitalism was carried on the principles of shock 
therapy (Dzarasov, 2010; Dow et al., 2008). It is strategy 
implying quick transformation with simultaneous im-
plementation of all main reforms. These reforms are 
price and trade liberalization, privatization and financial 
stabilization. Such approach was inspired by the famous 
doctrine known as the Washington Consensus (Da-
vidson, 2004).  
The point is that some reforms – for example, price 
liberalization, – require short period for its completion, 
other reforms – for example, creation of clear legal 
framework for market economy – require long one. So, 
strict shock therapy policy was transformed into the pro-
cess treated by me as "reverse gradualism". Those re-
forms that must be implemented later, took place more 
early (and vice versa). It is the definition of the "reverse 
gradualism". Such "bad" succession really complicated 
the transition to the market economy and also generated 
chaos and increased degree of uncertainty of the future. 
That is why, according to Post Keynesian perspective, 
shock therapy is adverse mode of transition (see also 
Tsang, 1996; Dow et al, 2008). 
The shock therapy policy’s implementation implied 
not shift but break in the institutional base of the eco-
nomic system. As a result, “the destruction of the old was 
hardly matched by the creation of market-oriented insti-
tutions of economic control” (Murrell, 1993, p. 137).  
This argument is relevant for the Russian capital-
ism born in the 1990s. In 1991, this country had still 
some analogue of the planned economy: “Price controls 
and state orders each applied to about 75 percent of eco-
nomic activity” (Murrell, 1993, p. 132). Contract law 
and other basic institutions of the market capitalism 
were not created yet. The 1992 year was the first year of 
implementation of the shock therapy policy. The out-
comes were the following: privatization without rules of 
law, price liberalization without workable competition, 
the government refusal from enterprise administration 
and control without emergence of efficient entrepre-
neurship and management, advertisement of “conspicu-
ous consumption” and "luxury life" without introduc-
tion of moral rules of civil society, etc. The Russian gov-
ernment had refused from administration of state enter-
prises in this period and become to perform very badly 
functions of legal protection of forward contracts. More-
over, it often violated its own contractual obligations. 
All this generated extremely high level of uncertainty in 
comparison with the Western capitalist economies and 
most Eastern-European post-socialist ones. 
The Russian version of shock therapy created in-
centives for various “shadow” and "black" activities 
ranging from trials to conceal income for the sake of tax 
evasion to real criminal acts. In other words, many Rus-
sian firms were engaged in the 1990s in diverse forms 
of the "shadow economy". Shock therapy – especially 
via privatization – generated “a breakdown of institu-
tional norms resulting in corruption and illegal activi-
ties” (Marangos, 2002, p 573). The Russian capitalism 
was emerged, to a considerable degree, as a criminal 
capitalism. It is not surprising that now both businesses 
of many influential Russians have criminal origin, and 
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some actions of the Russian governmental officers vio-
late (international or domestic) law. 
The 1990s were the period of “oligarchic discre-
tion”. As a result of shock therapy, the most of property 
was acquired – often illegally or something like that – 
by different oligarchic groups. Some of them had roots 
in the criminal world. The Russian agents wanted and 
very often were forced to circumvent the government. 
The emerged illegal economy took various shapes: tax 
evasion and all by-products of it, transactions with rights 
and licenses, production and selling of drugs etc. The 
perspectives of survival for private businesses not linked 
with oligarchic groups were very blurred in the 1990s. 
This capitalism was non-competitive. Oligarchic busi-
ness had big “comparative” advantages; small and me-
dium businesses that have no any protection from crim-
inal or semi-criminal groups had big “comparative” dis-
advantages. This “state-of-the-art” was supplemented 
by contradictions between many formal laws, slowly de-
veloping legal system, slow and inefficient work of 
courts, and other aspects of the underdeveloped institu-
tional environment. The slogans of “quick enrichment” 
and “conspicuous consumption” showed by the oligar-
chic aggressive advertisement also did not contribute to 
the successful economic development.  
In the 2000s, “bureaucratic discretion” substituted 
for “oligarchic discretion”. New President – Mr. 
Putin – started to form “power vertical”. Different oli-
garchic groups – that were not loyal to President and his 
friends – had been weakened or destroyed (case of 
Khodorkovsky is the most famous example). In order to 
survive in the business world close links with the power 
authorities started to become more and more important. 
The bureaucratic raids of the private property and busi-
nesses became more and more “popular”. The Russian 
capitalism remained non-competitive. Institutions – as 
in the 1990s – did not protect agents investing money in 
the productive assets. At the present time, the situation 
with lack of institutional protection of investors’ and 
owners’ rights is likely to be worsened.  
 
Uncertainty and Productive Underinvestment 
in Post-Soviet Russia 
During the 1990s Russia had suffered from fantas-
tic collapse of productive investment. In 1998 real in- 
vestment was equal to only 21% of pre-reform 1990 
value (Dzarasov, 2011, p 199). Such investment col-
lapse was not only factor of the great fall of aggregate 
demand and GDP (In 1998 real GDP was equal to 57% 
of 1990 value), but also a phenomenon contributing to 
deindustrialization and technological degradation of the 
Russian economy. For example, the average age of in-
dustrial fixed capital has fallen from 11 years in 1990 to 
21 years in 2004; and later data are not published at all. 
Some branches of highly technological manufacturing 
were partially or completely destroyed in the 1990s and 
later. 
It is Post Keynesian economics that explains thor-
oughly negative tendencies in the dynamics of produc-
tive investment on the macro level. According to the 
Post Keynesian approach, not relative prices but invest-
ment “… is the central point in the economy. Investment 
is dynamic, constantly in motion, and never resting in an 
“equilibrium” position” (Marangos, 2002, p. 575). The 
fluctuations of business activity are concerned, mainly, 
with changes in the demand for durable assets: increas-
ing investments as purchases of productive durable as-
sets contribute to rising GDP and employment but in-
creasing demand for money and other non-productive 
assets do not contribute to GDP and creation of new jobs 
(Davidson, 1972; Minsky, 1975; Carvalho, 1992). In 
turn, choice of durable assets is the inherent feature of 
any economy faced with the uncertainty of the future. 
The point is that institutions of the Russian transi-
tional economy discouraged productive investment and 
encouraged purchases of various non-productive liquid 
assets. These institutions failed to reduce uncertainty in 
a considerable degree. Broadly speaking, the idea of the 
negative influence of uncertainty of the future on fixed 
investment is commonplace for Post Keynesian eco-
nomics (Carvalho, 1992; Davidson, 1972; Keynes, 
1936, ch.12; Minsky, 1975; 1986). We already men-
tioned above that shock therapy have generated extreme 
uncertainty of the future. In this environment, the Rus-
sian potential investors had no any bases for sensible in-
vestment decision-making. It was not very surprising, at 
least, for Post Keynesian economists that collapse of 
fixed investment took place.  
Higher uncertainty contributed to low animal spir-
its (Keynes, 1936, ch. 12) and total lack of confidence 
of investors. I already suggested that in the 1990s only 
those investors who had close links with influential 
criminal and “quasi-criminal” groups could hope for the 
protection of their property and contract rights. The 
most agents preferred to acquire various “surrogate store 
of values” (Grahl, 1988) in the forms of foreign curren-
cies and other financial assets, precious metals, an-
tiques, Old Masters rather than fixed capital and other 
productive assets. For example, according to various es-
timations, capital flight from Russia in the 1990s was 
equal to 100 – 500 billion US dollars. These forms of 
non-productive investment can be treated as arational 
reactions to higher uncertainty and impossibility to 
make calculated decisions. Such fixed capital invest-
ment collapse is a something like an effect of mass psy-
chosis due to sharp break with the planned economy’s 
institutions and lack of new effective “market” institu-
tions in the process of the shock therapy policy’s imple-
mentation.  
After 1998 – year of the Russian government’ de-
fault – there were not radical changes in this situation. 
Various private “shadow” oligarchic groups were dis-
placed in the 2000s by the “agents” possessing close 
links with the “friends of the President” and other “in-
fluential people” from the government. As I already 
mentioned, “bureaucratic discretion” substituted for “ol-
igarchic discretion”. It hardly improved a protection of 
those who made decision to invest in durable GDP-cre-
ating assets. “Climate” for productive investors – if they 
were not concerned with “friends of the President” – re-
mained “cold” in general.  
I. Rozmainsky 
24 
Економічний вісник Донбасу № 4(46), 2016 
Increased investment in the period between 1999 
and 2008 was a reaction to both sharp rouble deprecia-
tion in 1998 August (after the Russian government de-
fault) and rising oil prices in the 2000s. However, there 
are no reasons to say that institutional environment 
strongly improved. It became clear since 2008 when 
GDP not concerned with oil and gas sectors ceased to 
grow, and especially since 2013 when total GDP ceased 
to grow. The current 2016 year is the year of the contin-
ued crisis with decreasing investment activity. Potential 
investors do not trust each other and have no confidence 
in the future of the Russian economy.     
Inability of the Post-Soviet institutions to reduce 
uncertainty generated such phenomenon as investor my-
opia. What does it mean? In order to give the answer I 
would like to start from mentioning short-termism, 
which in mainstream economics is usually defined as 
“the pessimistic under-weighting of expected future re-
turns and/or the excessive discounting of expected fu-
ture returns” (Juniper, 2000). It is clear that so defined 
short-termism leads to refusal from realization of some 
investment projects. Furthermore, as Juniper (2000) has 
pointed out, short-termism favors strategies of labor-
shedding and asset-stripping instead of strategies of 
skills formation and asset-renewal.  
The very important point is that all mainstream 
analysis of short-termism encompasses only equity mar-
ket (Miles, 1995). Usually short-termism is explained 
through an exploration of relationships between share-
holders and managers (for instance, see Dickerson et al., 
1995). Moreover, short-termism as the behavioral fea-
ture regards only these types of economic agents. The 
main reason for it is turnover on managerial or share-
holder side (Dickerson et al., 1995; Juniper, 2000).  
However, short-termism can be represented in 
more extreme form, although this form is often treated 
as a something that is different from short-termism it-
self. I imply investor myopia that means that agents 
evaluate consequences of their decisions only over 
short-time horizon (Juniper, 2000; see also Bellais, 
2004, pp. 430 – 431). In other words, investor myopia 
implies that agents exclude from the consideration val-
ues of future variables after some threshold time point. 
Unfortunately, there is no consistent theory of in-
vestor myopia as the most radical and important form of 
short-termism. In order to construct such theory, it is 
necessary to reject treatment of both short-termism and 
investor myopia as a phenomenon confined only to the 
equity market (Juniper, 2000). It seems to me that it is 
necessary to exceed the bounds of equity market in order 
to provide full analysis of this phenomenon. 
The point is that choice among durable assets is ra-
ther more “expanded” event than some decision regard-
ing equity market. It is completely consistent with the 
mentioned above Post Keynesian theory of durable as-
sets’ choice. Acquisition of fixed (and also human and 
health) capital, different non-equity speculations, vari-
ous illegal activity – all these things can be both type of 
choice of durable assets and transactions beyond equity 
market. Investor myopia can exist whenever decision 
about purchase of durable asset(s) should be made. - 
Investor myopia shows always itself to be a shift toward 
assets bearing short-term income across the whole spec-
trum of durable assets. Therefore, investor myopia af-
fects not only structure of stock market and choice be-
tween asset-renewal and asset-stripping (Juniper, 2000). 
This phenomenon can determine ratios between produc-
tive and mediatory activities, between skills formation 
and skills erosion, between health promotion and health 
loss, between technical-progress-inducing industries 
and other ones, between legal and illegal activities, and 
so on. The abovementioned surrogate stores of value 
(Grahl, 1988) attract mainly agents whose behavior 
characterized by investor myopia 
Investor myopia is complementary to very low an-
imal spirits (Keynes, 1936, ch. 12). The latter is a some-
thing like “spontaneous pessimism” regarding an ex-
pected profitability of any productive investments; the 
former is a something like “pessimism” regarding an ex-
pected profitability of any productive investments after 
some threshold point in time. Agents suffered from in-
vestor myopia are interested in exclusively short-term 
gains from any projects. Because the most productive 
investment projects generate incomes only in the long-
term future, such agents do not want to buy productive 
equipment and prefer to make purchases of various non-
productive assets.  
I offer to consider investor myopia as a reaction to 
ineffective institutional environment failing to reduce 
strongly uncertainty and to protect private owners and 
investors. The economy populated by the agents suffered 
from investor myopia has been doomed for the chronic 
underinvestment and technological backwardness. 
In turn, long fall of investment decreases capital 
stock and, consequently, capital-labor ratio, which can 
be treated as the argument in the technical progress 
function together with level of investment itself (Palley, 
1996; see also Bellais, 2004).  
 
Underinvestment and Degradation of Monetary 
System in Post-Soviet Russia.  
During the 1990s the Russian economy had faced 
with another adverse tendency: displacement of bank 
money from monetary circulation. Barter and various 
“quasi-monies” started to play enormous role. Monetary 
“surrogates were of countless varieties. They were is-
sued by government, and local authorities, banks, enter-
prises, and even individuals” (Dzarasov, 2010, p. 34).  
“The rise of… pure barter transactions, transactions in 
promissory notes, and mutual debt write-offs, was ob-
served in almost all of the 20-plus transition economies 
in the 1990s. However, it was most severe in Russia and 
Ukraine…” (Dow et al, 2008, p. 28).  According to 
Makarov and Kleyner (1999), the share of barter in the 
transactions with industrial products was equal in 1991–
94 to 40%, in 1995–1996 to 75%, and in 1997–99 to 80–
90%. According to Dow et al (2008, p. 18), “at its peak 
in 1998, nonmonetary transactions such as mutual write-
offs, promissory notes, and pure barter transactions con-
stituted more than 50 percent of industrial transactions 
in Russia”. Another substitute for bank money was cash: 
M0/M2 ratio had increased from approximately 18 per 
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cent in 1992 to almost 40 per cent in 1998. These events 
were accompanied by demonetization of the economy. 
Coefficient of monetization had fallen from 19.9 per 
cent in 1993 to 14.8 per cent in 1999, while in the UK, 
USA, Germany, France in the 1990s and 2000s this ratio 
was between 50 and 100 per cent; in Eurozone between 
1995 and 2005 it had increased from 72.5 per cent to 
89.2 per cent.  
So such changes in the structure of media of ex-
change were opposed to tendencies in financial evolu-
tion in the Western economies characterized by fall in 
M0/M2 ratio and expansion of new bank types of mon-
ies (Minsky, 1986). I believe that the described dynam-
ics of the monetary system of Russia in the 1990s was, 
to a considerable extent, due to the described above in-
vestment collapse. The great decrease of investment dis-
couraged monetary evolution: banks and other financial 
institutions had no incentives to invent new kinds of 
monies. Such “monetary degradation”, in turn, limited 
investment activity because led to a lack of finance for 
purchases of productive assets.     
In the 1990s economic agents forgot about invest-
ment and concentrated on purely production and (even 
more) exchange aspects. However, working capital 
turnover – unlike additions to fixed capital stock – can 
take place by means of using cash money, barter and 
mutual arrears. Furthermore, barter and arrears pro-
vided survival of insolvent firms, especially when bank-
ruptcy law really did not work (as in Russia in the 1990s; 
later bankruptcy law was used by corporate raiders). So, 
one the one hand, such deterioration of monetary system 
was the reaction on sharp macroeconomic slump in-
duced by shock therapy, on the other hand, it created 
barriers to “revival” of investment activity. It implied 
that there was improvement of technologies of conceal-
ment of outcomes of economic activity and/or this ac-
tivity itself – I can repeat that the Russian capitalism 
emerged as, to a considerable degree, as a criminal cap-
italism. Thus, the possibilities for expansion of shadow 
economy became wider. 
It is necessary to note that, unlike back money, cash 
and barter are anonymous. Use of it does not imply dis-
closure of information about the name(s) of transac-
tor(s). In this respect, cash is ideal mode of financing 
illegal activity in comparison with bank money. How-
ever, barter (and mutual arrears) has even more ad-
vantages. Firstly, barter allows to conceal genuine 
(monetary) value of goods. Secondly, accounting of ma-
terial things flows is more difficult than accounting of 
monetary flows. These advantages frequently more than 
offset disadvantages of barter that are concerned with its 
“awkwardness”. Therefore, with “help” of barter and 
mutual arrears the Russian agents often financed illegal 
activity in the 1990s.  
In turn, these events led to both further fall of GDP 
and cost-push inflation. In other words, displacement of 
bank money by cash, barter and arrears could inject cost 
inflation irrespective of the central bank policy. For ex-
ample, in 1997, “the Severovejsk engineering plant paid 
by surrogates (which means on barter terms) for the de-
livery of cast iron 2 million roubles per ton. In cash, its 
cost at the time was only 0.7 million roubles” (Dzarasov, 
2010, p. 35).   
It is not surprising that such adverse changes in 
monetary circulation could induce the government to re-
strict more its policy. For example, decrease of tax rev-
enue due to diffusion of barter and arrears might lead to 
new increase in tax burden. This increase was directed 
to balance the government budget. Similarly, accelera-
tion of inflation due to the same cause might lead to 
tightening of monetary policy; such policy was directed 
to disinflation. In the 1990s “Russian authorities started 
what, probably, was the most consistent experiment of 
the restrictive monetary policy in recent history” (Dzar-
asov, 2010, p. 33). Such policies are approved by the 
reforms-inspiring international organizations like IMF. 
However, described tightening was ineffective because 
it only intensified further expansion of barter and ar-
rears. 
However, the most dangerous effect of described 
bank money’s displacement was concerned with disinte-
gration, “fragmentation” of the economy. The point is 
that “normal” money, as is well known, is universal 
means of payment, unlike goods used in barter or obli-
gations of the enterprises. Arrears (or some commodity 
utilized in barter relations) of Firm A can be accepted by 
Firm B or Firm C; but Firm D and Firm E may refuse to 
make it and, therefore, will break economic links with 
the former three companies. That is why endogeneity of 
bank credit money and endogeneity of obligations of en-
terprises are fundamentally different things: the latter is 
extremely far from “full-fledged” money, because it 
cannot be both “the means of contractual settlement” 
and “one-way time machine” (Davidson, 1977, p. 542). 
Here I should emphasize the role of informal links 
between agents in shadow economy and the meaning of 
“bad” media of circulation for survival of insolvent 
firms. Barter and arrears allowed to strengthen above 
links and to provide more sharp divisions between 
“friends and foes”. The economy broke into discon-
nected local groups of economic agents. Furthermore, 
inefficient (and therefore insolvent for conditions of 
normal market economy) companies continued to live 
and did not to try to improve own efficiency, productiv-
ity, level of its technology etc. The main consequence of 
all this was both absence of incentives to technical pro-
gress and impossibility of horizontal diffusion of inno-
vations (Makarov and Kleyner, 1999). Such economy 
could maintain standards of living that are compatible 
with bare subsistence, but it had doomed on deepest 
technological stagnation and decline. This doom took 
place irrespective of liberalized prices, privatized enter-
prises, low rate of money supply growth approved by 
IMF, etc. It means that not only money is not neutral, 
but also the structure of money is not neutral. 
The described “monetary degradation” was 
stopped in the end of the 1990s due to positive macroe-
conomic (including external) shocks and successful 
shift in the government regulations (by prime-minister 
of those days Primakov), and also attainment of bare 
subsistence level. Almost all this happened in 1999 – 
2001: “Only after the restrictive monetary policy was 
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violently stopped by the crisis, did economic recovery 
ensue in Russia” (Dzarasov, 2010, p. 35).  
“The steady rise of oil prices also contributed to 
macroeconomic stabilization. As a result, since 1999, 
the economy’s reliance on cash money has steadily been 
declining and the importance of banking has slowly 
been increasing” (Dow et al, 2008, p. 18). The level of 
use of barter and monetary surrogates reached to 2001 
the very low, almost “non-visible”, level that is typical 
for the developed countries. Nevertheless, some lega-
cies of the described adverse tendencies in the monetary 
circulation in the 1990s remain now. These ones are low 
coefficient of monetization, large M0/M2 ratio and ab-
sence of such monetary aggregates as M3 and M4. 
Above I already wrote that in 1999 coefficient of mone-
tization was equal to 14.8 per cent. It did steady increase 
until 2013 when it was equal to 47.1 per cent that is very 
low value according to the international standards. Dur- 
ing 2000 – 2014 M0/M2 ratio has fallen from 0.37 to 
0.22. This was a good tendency, but 22 per cent of M0 
relatively to M2 is very large size, according to the 
standards of the developed countries (less than 10 per 
cent). The economy with “degraded”, “underdeveloped” 
structure of media of exchange cannot rapidly grow on 
the “internal base”: local groups of informally linked 
agents are closed and self-contained structures that have 
no ability to develop and to innovate. It is the reverse 
side of the “bureaucratic discretion” in the contempo-
rary Russian economy.   
 
Conclusions. According to the Post Keynesian 
Economics, the most essential feature of the Post-Soviet 
Russian model of capitalism is higher uncertainty due to 
ineffective institutions. Property rights of the Russian 
agents are poorly protected. Contracts are not enforced 
effectively. Some laws are not consistent with other 
laws. Courts work slowly and inefficiently. Corruption 
and bribes are the commonplace of the economic activ-
ity. Barriers to entry are very high for almost any com-
pany that has no links or friendship with “influential 
groups”. In the 1990s “links and contacts” with private 
criminal groups were often necessary condition for sur-
vival of many private businesses. In the 2000s and 2010s 
similar “links and contacts” with the state authorities be-
came necessary prerequisites for survival of almost any 
businesses. As a result, in contemporary Russia – espe-
cially Russia of the “Crimea period” – different types of 
agents have different degrees of legal protection and 
abilities. Companies created by or concerned with dif-
ferent “friends of the President” and “friends of the 
friends of the President” are in the best position. “Ordi-
nary” businesses without any “important links and con-
tacts” are at the “opposite end of the spectrum”. Owners 
of such businesses have no adequate protection against 
possible raiders concerned with the authorities.  
This institutional environment reduces uncertainty 
very ineffectively. It discourages many productive in-
vestment projects because rights of the most potential 
and actual investors are very poorly protected. Various 
dangers surrounding any productive investment projects 
are supplemented – in the contemporary Russian eco- 
nomy – by the dangers generated by the ineffective in-
stitutions. Therefore, many potential investors prefer to 
buy – instead of GDP-creating productive equipment – 
various “surrogate stores of value” in the form of differ-
ent non-productive assets like foreign financial assets, 
antiques, precious metals, Old Masters, old part of real 
estate etc. Animal spirits are very low, and investor my-
opia rules the roost. 
In 2015 investment/GDP ratio was equal to 18%. 
This figure is very small for the country that has plans 
of massive “import substitution” strategy and “autono-
mous”, “independent development”. Russia of the “Cri-
mea period” has doomed for the underinvestment and 
technological backwardness. This situation is aggra- 
vated by low coefficient of monetization, high M0/M2 
ration and absence of monetary aggregates M3 and M4. 
The backwardness of monetary and financial systems 
contributes to a “fragmentation” of the economy: many 
groups of agents are closed and self-contained structures 
with no incentives to develop and to innovate. In order 
to escape from this situation is to reform radically exist-
ing institutions. The Russian institutional system should 
provide more predictability for those who invest in 
GDP-creating productive equipment.  
All these conclusions are derived from an applica-
tion of Post Keynesian Economics to the Post-Soviet 
Russian economy. The contemporary Russian model of 
capitalism “copes with uncertainty” very ineffectively 
and, therefore, discourages productive investment. The 
Russian agents prefer to buy non-productive durable as-
sets not contributing to GDP and employment. As a re-
sult, economic backwardness of Russia becomes 
stronger.  
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 Розмаїнський І. В. Основні елементи пост-
кейнсіанського аналізу пострадянської моделі 
російського капіталізму 
У статті зроблена спроба дати посткейнсіан-
ське пояснення найбільш важливих проблем постра-
дянського російського капіталізму. Основна ідея по-
лягає в тому, що інститути капіталізму такого типу 
неефективно зменшують невизначеність. Основною 
причиною цього є нездатність держави як ефектив-
ного виконавця контрактів. У свою чергу, більш ви-
сока невизначеність призводить до хронічного недо-
фінансування, деіндустріалізації, технологічної де-
градації і схильності занурюватися в пастку відста-
лості. Супутнім явищем є недостатньо розвинена 
грошова система. Всі ці фактори сприяють значній 
економічній відсталості сучасної російської еконо-
міки.  
Ключові слова: посткейнсіанська економіка, не-
визначеність, контракти, перехід, Росія, капіталізм. 
 
Розмаинский И. В. Основные элементы 
посткейнсианского анализа постсоветской мо-
дели российского капитализма 
В статье сделана попытка дать посткейнсиан-
ское объяснение наиболее важных проблем постсо-
ветского российского капитализма. Основная идея 
заключается в том, что институты капитализма та-
кого типа неэффективно уменьшают неопределен-
ность. Основной причиной этого является неспособ-
ность государства как эффективного исполнителя 
контрактов. В свою очередь, завышенная неопреде-
ленность приводит к хроническому недофинансиро-
ванию, деиндустриализации, технологической де-
градации и склонности погружаться в ловушку от-
сталости. Сопутствующим явлением есть недоста-
точно развитая денежная система. Все эти факторы 
способствуют значительной экономической отста-
лости современной российской экономики.  
Ключевые слова: посткейнсианская экономика, 
неопределенность, контракты, переход, Россия, ка-
питализм. 
 
Rozmainsky I. The Basic elements of the post 
keynesian analysis of the post-soviet model of Rus-
sian capitalism 
The paper tries to give Post Keynesian explanation 
of the most important problems of the Post-Soviet Rus-
sian Capitalism. The main idea is that institutions of this 
type of capitalism reduce uncertainty ineffectively. The 
main cause of it is a failure of the state as the effective 
enforcer of the contracts. In turn, higher uncertainty 
leads to chronic underinvestment, deindustrialization, 
technological degradation and tendency to sink into the 
underdevelopment trap. The accompanying phenome-
non is the underdeveloped monetary system. All these 
factors contribute to the significant economic backward-
ness of the modern Russian economy.  
Keywords: Post Keynesian economics, uncer-
tainty, contracts, transition, Russia, capitalism. 
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